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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN AN
ALL-VOLUNTEER MILITARY*
CAPTAIN ROBERT L. LARSEN JR.**
COLONEL THEODORE G. HESS***
I. INTRODUCTION
Conscientious objection to military service is not a new con-
cept. It dates back to the founding of this nation and beyond. Dur-
ing the drafting of the Bill of Rights, James Madison originally
proposed a version of the Second Amendment exempting persons
"religiously scrupulous of bearing arms" from compelled military
service.1 Although this version was not adopted, its mere proposal
demonstrates the Founding Fathers' respect for the principle of
conscientious objection.2
Yet even the Founding Fathers looked at conscientious objec-
tion only as it related to conscripted military service. They never
* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors, and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, the
Department of the Navy, or the United States Marine Corps.
** Administrative law attorney, Headquarters Marine Corps; B.A., Notre Dame Uni-
versity; J.D., Catholic University. Capt. Larsen was the Marine Corps' action attorney on
conscientious objector issues during the Gulf War.
*** Director, Appellate Government Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Department of the Navy; B.A., Cornell University; J.D., State University of New York at
Buffalo; M.A., U.S. Naval War College. Col. Hess was responsible for Marine Corps adminis-
trative and civil law matters during the Gulf War, including mobilization and conscientious
objector issues. The author would like to thank the staff members of the St. John's Law
Review for their assistance in the completion of this article.
1 1 ANNALS OF THE CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). Madison's original version of the
Second Amendment read: "That the right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed;
a well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no
person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service
in person." Id. (emphasis added).
2 See Michael W. McConnel, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1468-80 (1990). That Congress ultimately deleted
the language regarding conscientious objection from the Second Amendment does not belie
the Founding Fathers' respect for this principle. The Founding Fathers had many heated
debates about whether to include a Bill of Rights at all and feared that enumerating certain
rights would eliminate others by omission, or would limit each enumerated right to its lan-
guage in the amendment. See id.
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contemplated a volunteer force such as exists today. Their idea of
an all-volunteer force was the Minutemen, who would simply grab
their rifles and go to fight when the bell was sounded; a far cry
from the relationship volunteer military servicemembers have to
their respective services today. Conscientious objection among the
Minutemen was a logical absurdity.
The Persian Gulf War presented the first wartime situation in
which conscientious objection was raised in the modern brand of
all-volunteer United States military. Conscientious objection in
this new all-volunteer force is problematic at best. All volunteer
servicemembers are screened and must affirm, prior to entry into
the military, that they are not conscientious objectors.3 One could
argue that this should be all the protection conscientious objectors
need in an all-volunteer force-if you are opposed to participation
in war, do not join the military. The Department of Defense has
seen fit, however, to accommodate the needs of those ser-
vicemembers who have a legitimate change of heart after joining
the military by establishing procedures for receiving and evaluat-
ing claims of conscientious objection.'
II. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
In contrast to the comprehensive conscientious objector sys-
tem in place in the United States today, it is surprising that the
international community has never really taken an in-depth look
at this issue. The United Nations Charter does not address it, nor
do any United Nations resolutions or regulations. This lack of
guidance is due to the absence of an international consensus on
what a nation can and should do to ensure itself an adequately
staffed armed force.
Consider the case of Muslim fundamentalist theocracies where
military service is a religious duty. The idea of conscientious objec-
tion simply does not apply in these countries because the people
and their national leadership are supposed to be in* moral and reli-
gious agreement. When the national religious leaders of Iran, for
instance, call for a "holy war," the common soldier does not object
on religious grounds. In communist countries, on the other hand,
military service is an accepted part of political indoctrination and,
Department of Defense Form 1966, Record of Military Processing, Armed Forces of
the United States 2 (1989).
" See 32 C.F.R. pt. 75 (1991).
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since Marxism rejects religion, religion-based conscientious objec-
tion has no accepted place in these societies.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights5 in-
directly addressed the conscientious objector issue in its prohibi-
tion of "forced or compulsory labor."" The definition of "forced or
compulsory labor" specifically excludes military service, even for
countries that do not allow conscientious objection.7 Forced mili-
tary service is apparently not considered forced labor. For coun-
tries that do allow conscientious objection, mandatory alternative
civilian service is also not considered "forced or compulsory la-
bor."' This document aside, the lack of international review of the
conscientious objector issue would seem to suggest that most of the
world considers military service to be an issue best left to individ-
ual sovereign nations to resolve according to their own standards of
moral conduct.
Amnesty International ("AI"), an organization of international
influence, takes a different tack with the conscientious objector is-
sue. AI took a very active role in the conscientious objector debate
during the Persian Gulf War, declaring several Marine Corps ap-
plicants "prisoners of conscience" after these Marines were court-
martialed for various desertion and unauthorized absence of-
fenses. AI's approach is quite perplexing given its definitions of
"conscientious objector" and "prisoner of conscience."
AI defines a conscientious objector as "a person who may be
drafted for military service and who, for reasons of conscience or
profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humani-
tarian, philosophical, political, or similar motives, refuses to per-
form armed service or participate directly or indirectly in wars or
armed conflicts." '10 Under this definition, no United States ser-
5 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 8, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 175. The United States is a signatory to this covenant, but it has never been





' See United States of America: Amnesty International Takes up Conscientious Ob-
jector as Prisoner of Conscience, AhimsTy INr'L NEws RELEASE, Feb. 7, 1991; Letter from
Dina Coloma, America's Research Department, Amnesty International, to Robert L. Larsen,
Captain, U.S. Marine Corp. Reserve (Apr. 22, 1991) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Letter].
10 THE AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK (Marie Staunton et al. eds., 1991) (emphasis
added).
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vicemember could be a conscientious objector because the United
States simply no longer uses a draft.
AI's definition of a "prisoner of conscience" also speaks of
"conscription" and "persons liable to conscription."" AI defines
"prisoners of conscience" as individuals who are jailed for refusing
military service or refusing to register for conscription, and who
meet one of several other criteria. 12 One of these criteria is that
"there is not a right to alternative service which is of purely civil-
ian character and under civilian control."" The United States, of
course, has such alternative service-IBM or Exxon, for example,
or anywhere else in the civilian world one may choose to work if
one chooses not to join the military. Given its definitional frame-
work, it is not surprising that AI's attempts to apply its standards
to the United States military often do not comport with the reali-
ties of the situation.
4
III. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED
FORCE
Federal courts have consistently upheld the military's position
that "there is no constitutional right to exemption from military
service because of conscientious objection or religious calling."' 5
Immunity from military service arises solely through congressional
or executive grace. In pursuance of the traditional American policy
of deference to conscientious objection, 6 Congress has included
provisions for conscientious objection by draftees in the Military
Selective Service Act of 194811 and the Secretary of Defense has
11 Amnesty International, International Secretariat, Conscientious Objection to Mili-
tary Service 1 (1991).
12 Id.
13 Id.
1 Private First Class Erik Larsen, United States Marine Corps Reserve, was declared a
"prisoner of conscience" by Amnesty International prior to his court-martial, while under no
form of pretrial restraint. Several other Marines were declared "prisoners of conscience"
despite their guilty pleas to the offenses for which they were imprisoned.
16 Richter v. United States, 181 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892
(1950). The Ninth Circuit noted in Richter that Congress can compel military service by a
citizen whenever necessary or when an emergency exists. Id. at 593. The court rejected the
claim of exemption based on freedom of religion, emphasizing that "[t]he rights of religion
are not beyond limitation." Id. at 594; see also United States v. Bertram, 477 F.2d 1329,
1330 (10th Cir. 1973) (right to freedom of religion not "an unbridled one in that it is subject
to the power of Congress to raise and support armies").
16 See Richter, 181 F.2d. at 593; Rase v. United States, 129 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942).
' Military Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604, 612-13 (codi-
[Vol. 66:687
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION
established a conscientious objector system for volunteers. 18
A. Judicial Standards for Conscientious Objection
The conscientious objector application system in place in the
United States military today was forged from the Military Selec-
tive Service Act of 1948 and the federal caselaw that reviewed that
Act. Section 456(j) of the Act exempts from conscripted combatant
training and service any person who "by reason of religious train-
ing and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in
any form."' 9 Under the definition of "religious training and belief,"
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code" may not serve as a basis for an ex-
emption under the Act.20 Extensive judicial review of this provision
has resulted in a detailed framework for examination of conscien-
tious objector applications.
1. Criteria for Conscientious Objection
The federal courts have created three basic criteria an appli-
cant must meet to establish a "prima facie case" for conscientious
objector status. The applicant "must demonstrate that he is op-
posed to war in any form, that this opposition is rooted in 'reli-
gious training and beliefs,' and that he is sincere in his beliefs. ' 21
The Department of Defense has codified and utilized these re-
quirements in processing conscientious objector applications.22 Fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Seeger,
the Department of Defense Directive on Conscientious Objectors
fled as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473, 456(0) (1988)).
18 U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DiREcTwE ON CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS, No. 1300.6 (Aug. 20,
1971) (codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 75 (1991)) [hereinafter DoDDIR 1300.6].
'9 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1990).
20 Id. The original Act also required a belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" as part
of an individual's "religious training and belief." Military Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub.
L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604, 613. This requirement was removed from the statute after the
Supreme Court interpreted it to require that the belief "occupfy] a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for
the exemption." United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
21 Goodrich v. Marsh, 659 F. Supp. 855, 857 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (summarizing Supreme
Court case law) (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (opposition to war in
all forms); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (opposition rooted in religious train-
ing and belief); and United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (sincerity of belief)); see
also Taylor v. Clayton, 601 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting same three
requirements).
22 See 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(a) (1991).
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has expanded the reach of the term "religious training and beliefs"
to include "solely moral or ethical beliefs even though the appli-
cant himself may not characterize these beliefs as 'religious' in the
traditional sense, or may expressly characterize them as not reli-
gious."23 These moral and ethical beliefs must, however, be held
with the "strength and devotion of traditional religious conviction"
and may not rest "solely on considerations of policy, pragmatism,
expediency, or political views."'24
In addition to the three court-imposed requirements, the De-
partment of Defense has imposed an oft-overlooked fourth crite-
rion for conscientious objector status. To be eligible for conscien-
tious objector status, an applicant's beliefs must not have
crystallized prior to the applicant's entry into military service.25
No one is forced to join the United States military, so it makes no
sense for conscientious objectors to join the service in the first
place. If they do join despite their alleged beliefs, two inferences
arise. First, they are trying to deceive the Government by joining
the military with no intention to fight if called to do so. Second,
their alleged beliefs are insincere, since they are willing to put
them aside for the sake of military pay and benefits.
2. Burden of Proof and Standard of Review
An applicant for conscientious objector status must establish
his or her prima facie case by clear and convincing evidence.26
Once this is done, the burden shifts to the reviewing authority (the
Government) to establish a rational basis in fact for denying the
application. 7
Judicial review of the rational basis in fact standard is "the
narrowest review known to the law."'28 Because the fundamental
23 DoDDIR 1300.6, supra note 18, at para. III(B) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 75.3(b)
(1991)).
24 Id.
25 Id. at para. IV(A)(1) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 75.3(b) (1991)).
26 Id. at para. V(D) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(d)(1991)).
27 Taylor v. Clayton, 601 F.2d 1102, 1103 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding no basis in fact for
government's finding of insincerity); Shaffer v. Schlesinger, 531 F.2d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 1976)
(holding that petitioner's objection to some, but not all, wars was sufficient basis in fact to
deny application); Nurnberg v. Frochlke, 489 F.2d 843, 848 (2d Cir. 1973) (ruling sufficient
basis in fact to deny application where petitioner's conscientious objection crystallized
before enlistment).




right to freedom of religion is involved, one might expect an ele-
vated standard of review. The Supreme Court has recognized, how-
ever, that "it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight
... wars should the occasion arise. "29 By providing broad discre-
tion to the military, the continued use of this lower standard of
review takes into account the national security considerations cre-
ated by conscientious objection.
The rational basis in fact test is not entirely without teeth,
though. A court reviewing a denial of a conscientious objector ap-
plication must still "carefully scrutinize the logic and reasoning of
the [tribunal that denied the application]." 30 As one court stated:
A basis in fact will not find support in mere disbelief or surmise
as to the applicant's motivation. Rather, the Government must
show some hard reliable, provable facts which would provide a
basis for disbelieving the applicant's sincerity, or it must show
something concrete in the record which substantially blurs the
picture painted by the applicant. 1
Thus, a mere suspicion of insincerity is an inadequate basis in fact
to deny a conscientious objector application.2
3. Insufficient Bases for Denial
In the process of determining what the Government must rely
on in denying a conscientious objector application, the courts have
also identified certain impermissible grounds for denying these ap-
plications. The timing of the conscientious objection claim, the ap-
plicant's belief in the use of force in certain circumstances, and the
applicant's belief in a spiritual war have been determined by the
courts to be improper or insufficient bases for denying conscien-
tious objector applications.
a. Timing
The timing of an application "is not by itself a basis-in-fact
for rejecting as insincere an otherwise acceptable C.O. claim, al-
29 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
30 Reinhard v. Gorman, 471 F. Supp. 112, 113 (D.D.C. 1979) (careful examination of
Board's reasoning revealed lack of factual basis for doubting petitioner's sincerity).
1 Hager v. Hanscom, 938 F.2d 1449, 1454 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Smith v. Laird, 486
F.2d 307, 310 (10th Cir. 1973)).
32 Shaffer v. Schlesinger, 531 F.2d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 1976).
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though, together with other evidence, it may be given weight."33 In
other words, the mere fact that someone files for conscientious ob-
jector status the day before his or her unit is to deploy to the front
is not a sufficient basis to deny the application. To hold otherwise
would make it next to impossible to gain approval of a conscien-
tious objector claim during wartime when, arguably, the right to
conscientiously object is most important. On the other hand, to
discount this factor entirely ignores the reality that suspect timing
is often a reflection of improper motives in filing for conscientious
objector status.
b. Use of Force in Certain Circumstances
In general, "[a]greement that force can be used to restrain
wrongdoing, especially as the last alternative, has little bearing on
an attitude toward war."'3 4 Support for the use of force in civilian
law enforcement work is, for example, consistent with a conscien-
tious objector claim.3 5 This is not to say, however, that an appli-
cant's attitude toward the use of force is never relevant. For in-
stance, if an individual claims a total aversion to the use of guns as
a basis for his or her conscientious objection, but holds a civilian
law enforcement job that requires the individual to carry a
weapon, that fact is certainly relevant to the issue of sincerity.
Also, keeping a handgun in the home for one's own protection may
be consistent with conscientious objection. If, however, an individ-
ual keeps a virtual arsenal of warlike weaponry at home, this fact
may be relevant to a determination of whether this individual is a
genuine conscientious objector.
Goldstein v. Middendorf, 535 F.2d 1339, 1344 (1st Cir. 1976).
, United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968). In Purvis, an eighteen-year-
old Quaker boy refused to submit to conscription into the United States armed forces. Id. at
556-57. Purvis contended, as a conscientious objector, that military authorities should have
exempted him "from all military service rather than from combatant service alone." Id. at
556. The Department of Justice relied on the objector's admission that "he would bear arms
... and even kill if necessary to defend the United States against an aggressive attack by an
armed enemy." Id. at 558. In addition, the Justice Department cited Purvis's "belie[f] in the
use of force only if it is used as the only alternative to restrain an individual from doing
wrong." Id. at 563. In upholding Purvis's "long-held convictions" and "sincere religious be-
lief," the court noted that the statutory "exemption for conscientious objectors does not
speak of objection to force, but rather of conscientious objection to 'participation in war in
any form.'" Id.
11 See Goodrich v. Marsh, 659 F. Supp. 855, 858 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
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c. Belief in a Spiritual War
Under Defense Department procedures, "[a] belief in a theo-
cratic or spiritual war between the powers of good and evil does
not constitute a willingness to participate in 'war'."36 We processed
some conscientious objector applications in which members of the
Islamic faith relied on this exception to explain why the apparent
sanction of "holy wars" by their religion is consistent with their
claim of conscientious objection. They claimed they could be both
Muslims and conscientious objectors because the Koran only re-
quires them to answer the call to a spiritual holy war. They were,
therefore, still opposed to participation in any physical manifesta-
tion of war. It should be noted, that conscientious objection is a
deeply personal matter, and conscientious objector applications are
not bound by all the tenets of their religion.
B. Current Department of Defense Procedures
Current Department of Defense procedural rules and policy
for handling conscientious objector applications were promulgated
by Department of Defense Directive 1300.6, Conscientious Objec-
tors,37 issued on August 20, 1971. This Directive, first issued on
August 21, 1962, and amended in 1967 and 1971, was the first doc-
ument to extend to in-service conscientious objectors the rights af-
forded draftees by the Military Selective Service Act of 1948. As
such, it was the first document to allow for conscientious objection
by volunteers. Each service has its own order or regulation gov-
erning conscientious objection, which may expand upon, but not
contradict, the Department of Defense Directive.38
The process begins when a servicemember applies for consci-
entious objector status in writing.39 A written application requires
at least some degree of forethought on the part of the ser-
vicemember and has the advantage of committing the ser-
vicemember to a specific course of action. Once the application is
in writing, the applicant is hard pressed to deny its authenticity.
Many conscientious objector applicants are simply frightened
" DoDDIR 1300.6, supra note 18, at para. V(B)(2) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 75.5(b)(2)
(1991)).
11 DoDDIR 1300.6, supra note 18.
38 32 C.F.R. § 75.2 (1991) (procedures for conscientious objector processing govern
"Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and all Reserve components thereof').
" Id. § 75.6(a).
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young men and women facing their own mortality for the first
time. Requiring them to put their beliefs down in writing puts
them on notice that the conscientious objection process is not a
simple quick fix for their problems-and is not without negative
consequences.
An applicant may apply for either 1-0 or 1-A-0 status. 40 A
class 1-0 conscientious objector is one who, "by reason of conscien-
tious objection, sincerely objects to participation of any kind in
war in any form." '41 A class 1-A-0 conscientious objector is one who,
"by reason of conscientious objection, sincerely objects to partici-
pation as a combatant in war in any form, but whose convictions
are such as to permit military service in a non-combatant status."'42
Department of Defense policy provides that "[t]o the extent
practicable under the circumstances, during the period applica-
tions are being processed, and until a decision is made, . . . every
effort will be made to assign applicants to duties which will conflict
as little as possible with their asserted beliefs. '43 On the other
hand,
an applicant shall be required to comply with active duty or
transfer orders in effect at the time of his [or her] application or
subsequently issued and received. During the period applications
are being processed, applicants will be expected to conform to the
normal requirements of military service and to perform such du-
ties as are assigned. 44
The procedures regarding compliance with active duty and
transfer orders generated considerable controversy during the Per-
sian Gulf War, and resulted in different policy formulations in
each of the armed services. The services agree on one point, how-
ever: neither the Department of Defense directive, nor any of the
individual service regulations proscribe deploying applicants to
hostile fire zones with their units; and that has been a major point
of contention in the conscientious objection debate.
After receiving the application, the commanding officer ar-
ranges for the applicant to see a chaplain and a psychiatrist. The
psychiatric interview is fairly perfunctory and is designed primar-
ily to determine if the individual is psychiatrically fit for duty. The
4 Id. § 75.3.
1 Id. § 75.3(a)(1).
42 Id. § 75.3(a)(2).




psychiatrist's recommendation usually amounts to nothing more
than a determination that the applicant is fit for duty. Occasion-
ally, however, an application for conscientious objector status is a
manifestation of some mental irregularity, rather than an expres-
sion of a legitimate moral or religious awakening or conversion.
These cases are screened out so that mentally infirm ser-
vicemembers can receive appropriate medical attention, which is
not provided by the conscientious objector process.
The chaplain's interview serves a much different and more im-
portant purpose. The chaplain is a commander's duty expert on
religious and moral issues. Because of this expertise, the chaplain
is the most competent person in the command to probe the sincer-
ity and depth of an individual applicant's beliefs. Chaplains can
use their knowledge and training to explore the applicant's under-
standing of the moral, ethical, or religious code he or she has
adopted. A proper chaplain's recommendation will address each of
the criteria for conscientious objector status and make an ultimate
recommendation of approval or disapproval of the application. Be-
cause the chaplain is considered an expert, and is one of the few
people in the process to meet and talk with the applicant first-
hand, a chaplain's recommendation is given great weight in subse-
quent consideration of conscientious objector applications.
In addition to scheduling the psychiatric and chaplain inter-
views, the applicant's commanding officer appoints an officer to act
as the investigator and hearing officer for the application.45 The
investigating officer must be senior in rank to the applicant, and at
least a paygrade 0-3 (captain or Navy lieutenant).46 To avoid any
potential conflict of interest, the investigating officer may not be in
the applicant's chain of command. 7 Investigating officers need not
be lawyers, but lawyers are often chosen for their superior under-
standing of quasi-judicial processes.48
Investigating officers gather all the relevant evidence they
deem necessary to formulate a recommendation for approval or
disapproval of the application. They consider the chaplain and
psychiatric interviews. They either personally interview or collect
45 Id. § 75.6(d).
46 Id.
4. Id.
4, See id. Although legal training is not required, the investigating officer must review
applicable service regulations and obtain "all necessary legal advice from the local Staff
Judge Advocate or legal officer." Id. § 75.6(d)(1).
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written statements from the applicant's commanding officer, mem-
bers of the applicant's unit, civilian friends and family of the ap-
plicant, the applicant's civilian co-workers if any, and anyone else
deemed to have an opinion or information relevant to the sincerity
of the applicant's beliefs. Finally, the investigation officer may con-
sider relevant information from the applicant's service record.
Once the information is collected, the investigating officer con-
ducts a hearing at which the applicant may respond to or rebut
any of the information collected.49 The applicant may also submit
any new information he or she deems relevant to the process and
may make a sworn or unsworn statement, and present witnesses on
his or her own behalf.50 In addition, the applicant may be repre-
sented by counsel at his or her own expense. 51 Rules of evidence do
not apply at these hearings, thus the statements of any witnesses
not present may be sworn or unsworn; however, oral testimony
presented must be under oath or affirmation.52 A verbatim tran-
script of the hearing is not required, but the applicant may provide
a stenographer at his or her own expense to transcribe the hear-
ing. 3 In the absence of a verbatim record, the investigating officer
summarizes the testimony of the witnesses.54 The applicant may
address, on the record, any perceived discrepancies in the investi-
gating officer's summaries.55
Upon completion of the hearing, the investigating officer
prepares his or her report, which will form the administrative rec-
ord for the conscientious objector process. The report will contain
all of the statements and information considered by the investigat-
ing officer in making his or her recommendation, the transcript or
official summary of the hearing, and portions of the applicant's of-
ficial service record.5 6 The report must also contain the investigat-
"' Id. One of the primary purposes of the hearing is "to enable the investigating officer
to ascertain and assemble all [of the] relevant facts." Id. § 75.6(d)(2). Such a comprehensive
record facilitates "an informed recommendation by the investigating officer and an informed
decision on the merits by [a] higher authority." Id. Any failure by the applicant to cooperate
at the hearing will be reflected in the investigating officer's evaluation. Id. In addition, if an
applicant is inexcusably absent from the hearing, the investigating officer may proceed with
the process. Id.
50 Id. § 75.6(d)(2)(iii).
Id. § 75.6(d)(2)(i).
52 Id. § 75.6(d)(2)(ii). In general, the hearing is not an adversarial process. Id.
53 Id. § 75.6(d)(2)(iv).
54 Id.
55 Id.
'a Id. § 75.6(d)(3).
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ing officer's analysis of each of the three criteria for conscientious
objector status,57 and a specific recommendation for approval or
disapproval with supporting rationale.5 8
Copies of the report are forwarded to the applicant and the
commanding officer who appointed the investigating officer.59 The
applicant is notified that he or she may submit a rebuttal state-
ment within a specified time regarding any of the material con-
tained in the record. 0 If no rebuttal is submitted, that fact is
noted for the record. If the applicant does submit a rebuttal, it
becomes part of the record, along with any response the investigat-
ing officer or the commanding officer makes to the allegations in
the rebuttal. The commanding officer reviews the report for com-
pleteness and legal sufficiency. 1 If the report and investigation are
deficient, the commanding officer may order further investigation,
a new hearing, or a rewrite of the report.6 2 If the report is suffi-
cient, the commanding officer will endorse it up the chain of com-
mand along with his or her specific recommendation of approval or
disapproval."
The report proceeds up the chain of command, with each of-
ficer in that chain completely reviewing the record, and making a
specific recommendation for approval or disapproval. The appli-
cant may be given an additional opportunity to rebut the endorse-
ments of the chain of command before the report is forwarded to
the service headquarters for final action.6 4 This rebuttal is the ap-
plicant's last chance to affect the decision-making process.
At the service headquarters level, the report is submitted to a
review board. This board, whose existence is neither mandated by
law nor by Department of Defense directive, is informal and purely
advisory in nature. The board considers the application, with en-
dorsements from the chain of command, and makes a final recom-
mendation to the individual who has been delegated the authority
to make a final determination. The board may consult legal and
chaplain representatives to assist in making an informed recom-
mendation, although these are also not required by law or Depart-
7 Id. § 75.6(d)(3)(iv); see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
" Id. § 75.6(d)(3)(v).
59 Id. § 75.6(d)(3)(vi).
8O Id.
01 Id. § 75.6(e).
62 Id.
63 Id.
- Id. § 75.6(f).
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ment of Defense directive.
The conscientious objector process will result in one of three
possible outcomes. First, if an application for 1-0 conscientious ob-
jector status is approved, a letter is sent to the applicant's com-
manding officer directing that officer to effect a discharge .8  The
discharge will be characterized as either honorable or general based
on the applicant's service record.
Second, if an application for 1-A-O noncombatant status is ap-
proved, the applicant may be retained or discharged depending
upon the needs of the applicant's service.61 If the applicant is al-
ready serving in a noncombatant billet, he will generally remain in
that billet, but his or her duties and training will be adjusted to
comply with his or her religious beliefs. If the applicant is serving
in a combatant billet, his or her military occupational specialty
may be voided and he or she may be placed in a new noncomba-
tant billet. On the other hand, if retaining the applicant would not
meet the needs of the service, the service has the option of dis-
charging the applicant, even though he or she only applied for non-
combatant status.6
Finally, if either type of application is disapproved, the appli-
cant is returned to his or her normal duties. The servicemember's
application for conscientious objector status may be considered in
determining his or her potential for future service. The application
may not, however, be used as a basis for harassment or punitive
action. Of course, any statements contained within the administra-
tive record that relate to alleged criminal conduct by anyone may
be used in investigating and prosecuting such conduct.
At all times prior to an actual discharge, conscientious objec-
tor applicants remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, 8 and may be disciplined for violations thereof.69 The applica-
tion process need not be stopped by disciplinary or administrative
separation proceedings that could result in a discharge.7 0 Any dis-
charge received as a result of a court-martial or an administrative
separation proceeding, however, will take precedence over any con-
65 Id. § 75.7(a).
66 Id. § 75.7(b).
67 Id.
68 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1988).
69 32 C.F.R. § 75.6(g) (1991); see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (applicant




scientious objector discharge. Therefore, an applicant may not re-
ceive a conscientious objector discharge until all disciplinary action
has been resolved.71
Conscientious objectors who refuse to perform military duty,
wear the uniform, or otherwise comply with lawful orders lose all
of their veterans' benefits. 2 They also forfeit all rights to National
Service Life Insurance,73 Serviceman's Group Life Insurance,7 4 and
to naturalization through active duty service in the military during
a time of hostilities.7 5
IV. CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
A. Statistics
A great deal of misleading information was disseminated re-
garding the armed forces' handling of conscientious objectors dur-
ing the recent Persian Gulf War. A quick glance at statistics from
the war reveals a far different picture than the "witchhunt" por-
trayed in some quarters.
In reality, the United States military approved more applica-
tions than it disapproved in the year following the start of Opera-
tion Desert Shield. Specifically, out of 473 applications received,
270 were approved and 203 were disapproved. 6 The actual ap-
proval rate for applications received at service headquarters during
the Gulf War period was only about eight percent lower than the
71 Id. If, however, a nexus exists between improper denial of a conscientious objector
application and disciplinary action, for example, missing the movement of one's unit or re-
fusing to obey deployment orders, a U.S. district court will not abstain from ordering an
immediate discharge from the armed forces. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972). In addi-
tion, the Court of Military Appeals has suggested that this improper denial will be a defense
to disciplinary action, provided that the offense in question was specifically generated by the
denial of the application itself. See United States v. Lenox, 45 C.M.R. 88 (C.M.A. 1972);
United States v. Noyd, 40 C.M.R. 195 (C.M.A. 1969); United States v. Ashley, 48 C.M.R.
(A.F.C.M.R. 1973).
72 38 U.S.C. § 5303 (1988).
73 38 U.S.C. § 1911 (1988).
74 38 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
71 See 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) (1988).
71 The following statistics were provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Force Management and Personnel), September 19, 1991 and represent approxi-
mate figures of conscientious objector applications received by service headquarters as of
July 31, 1991:
1992]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
average approval rate during the previous five years." This is true
despite the fact that the application rate was nearly two and one-
half times higher during the Persian Gulf War than during compa-
rable peacetime periods. 8
B. Issues Raised During the Persian Gulf War
In addition to being the first large scale "test case" for consci-
entious objection to an all-volunteer United States armed force,
the Persian Gulf War raised a number of other interesting consci-
entious objection-related issues.
1. Selective Conscientious Objection
During and after the Persian Gulf War, some organizations
and individuals called for a change to Department of Defense pol-
icy to eliminate the requirement that a conscientious objector be
opposed to any and all wars. 9 These critics argued that individu-
als, as thinking human beings, should be allowed to apply their
own moral codes to each war and determine whether they were jus-
tified in fighting each war individually.8 "
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR DISCHARGE STATISTICS
AUGUST 1, 1990 TO JULY 31, 1991
MILITARY SERVICE RECEIVED APPROVED DISPPROVED
Army 255 139 116
Navy 94 64 30
Marine Corps 88 42 46
Air Force 36 25 11
DoD Total 473 270 203
Approval Rate-approximately 57 per cent
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR DISCHARGE STATISTICS
FISCAL YEAR 1985 TO FISCAL YEAR 1989
Approximately 127 applications per year approved Department of Defense-wide
Approval rate-approximately 65 per cent.
77 Id.
78 Id.
7' Letter, supra note 9 (proposing right to object to participation in a particular war);
see also Detroit Bishop Asks for Conscientious Objectors, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1990, at 13
(bishop requests statement asking Roman Catholics to be "selective conscientious objectors"
against Desert Storm).
8o This argument closely parallels the Just War Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, the
great Catholic theologian. See WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR
13-37 (1981). Just War theorists have set forth conditions necessary for permissible war. Id.
at 13. These conditions include the existence of a just cause, an examination of the compar-
ative justice between the parties, a probability of success outweighing the proportionate loss,
the exhaustion of peaceful remedies and right intention. See William V. O'Brien, Desert
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Muslims in the United States military raised the issue of se-
lective conscientious objection to the Persian Gulf War based on
specific religious grounds, rather than individual application of a
moral code. According to the Koran, Muslims will be banished to
hell for all eternity if they kill another Muslim believer.8' Muslim
servicemembers who firmly believe this admonition are thus sub-
ject to a sharp conflict between their religion and military duties
whenever the United States is involved in a military dispute with a
Muslim nation."2
War protesters in and out of the armed forces also raised se-
lective objections to the Gulf War on various ideological and prag-
matic grounds. For example, nine days before the ground war and
only six kilometers from the Saudi-Kuwait border, a would-be
Marine conscientious objector wrote to his commander as follows:
And like the Ex-President Jimmy Carter, who now teaches His-
tory at the University of Georgia, I believe sanctions and patient
compromise would have caused Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait
and that partial sanctions should always be held against a country
like Iraq. This I believe would save many lives and still cut Iraq's
plans to invade any other country. I also believe that the job of a
Superpower is promoting peace and advancement like we can do
better than any other country with our resources. Sir, I believe a
Superpower should not promote rash wars of needless destruction
for political gains as the U.S. is doing with having 90% of the
troops in the region. I think, Sir, that we are disguising the excuse
of fighting to rid crazy aggressors for our real intent of gung ho
capitalistic political control.8 3
Unfortunately for selective conscientious objectors, the con-
cept is unrealistic in any armed force and particularly so in an all-
volunteer armed force. Selective conscientious objection poses too
great a risk of disrupting the kind of teamwork, cohesiveness, and
effectiveness the world witnessed by United States forces in Opera-
tion Desert Storm. Selective conscientious objection has also been
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court as a matter of constitu-
Storm: A Just War Analysis, 66 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 797, passim (1992).
81 See generally IGNAZ GOLDZINER, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAw (1981)
(discussing development of Muslim law and theology).
82 See, e.g., Harriet Chaing, Gulf War Objector Turns Himself In-Oakland Marine
Reservist Faces Court-Martial, S.F. CHRON., May 16, 1991, at 18 (Muslim conscientious ob-
jector applicant).
83 United States v. C6ok, No. 92-0053, at App. Ex. VI (N.M.C.M.R. filed Jan. 8, 1992).
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tional law in Gillette v. United States,84 a Vietnam-era case.
In Gillette, the petitioners selectively objected to the Vietnam
war as an "unjust" war on religious grounds,85 and asserted that
the Government's unwillingness to recognize their objection imper-
missibly discriminated among religious beliefs and interfered with
their right to free exercise of religion."6 In rejecting both claims,
Justice Marshall found valid and neutral reasons for limiting con-
scientious objection to those who object to all wars. Observing that
selective conscientious objection is "intrinsically a claim of uncer-
tain dimensions, ' 87 Justice Marshall reasoned that even the at-
tempt to administer a selective conscientious objector program
"would involve a real danger of erratic or even discriminatory deci-
sion making." 88 Additionally noting that selective conscientious ob-
jection depends in part "upon particularistic factual beliefs and
policy assessments that presumably were overridden by the gov-
ernment that decides to commit lives and resources to a trial of
arms,"8 9 Justice Marshall echoed the prevalent concern that selec-
tive conscientious objection would "'open the doors to a general
theory of selective disobedience to law' and jeopardize the binding
quality of democratic decisions. "90
Operating together, Justice Marshall believed these concerns
could create a pernicious synergy destructive of the "spirit of pub-
lic service and the values of willing performance of a citizen's du-
ties that are the very heart of free government." '91 These same con-
cerns apply with even more force in the separate society of the
armed forces, where the overriding demands of discipline and duty
are more sensitive to dissension. When an individual joins the
United States armed forces, he is entrusting the Government with
the task of deciding what fight is the right fight. Indeed, the oath
of office for military personnel begins with the promise to "support
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all ene-
mies, foreign and domestic. ' ' "2
8, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
" Id. at 439, 448-49.
86 Id. at 439.
8" Id. at 455.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 459.
'o Id. at 459-60.
Id. at 460.
" 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1988) (emphasis added).
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2. Administration of Conscientious Objector Applicants
The Persian Gulf War required a lightning-like operational
transition from peace to war on the part of the United States mili-
tary. In addition, the armed forces mobilized reservists for the first
time since 1968. But it is safe to say that the services found them-
selves with regulations for conscientious objectors that had been
published with peacetime scenarios in mind. As a result, the
Marine Corps and the Army quickly learned some lessons regard-
ing the administration of conscientious objectors during a war.
When the Marine Corps began mobilizing its reservists, its
conscientious objector regulation had a provision in effect that
read: "A Marine reservist who applies for conscientious objector
status will not normally be ordered to involuntary active duty until
the application is resolved."9' In the absence of the Department of
Defense Directive on conscientious objectors, the Marine Corps
regulation could have been read to prevent the mobilization of a
reservist until his conscientious objector application had been fi-
nally adjudicated. Of course, as already mentioned, the Depart-
ment of Defense directive requires conscientious objector appli-
cants to "comply with active duty or transfer orders in effect at the
time of [their] application or subsequently issued and received.' '9 4
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review addressed
this apparent conflict in Lwin v. Cooper.9 5 On August 23, 1990,
pursuant to an Executive Order, the Secretary of Defense author-
ized the activation of reserve units.9 The Secretary's guidance
memorandum required unconditional reporting for active duty by
reservists. Only after reporting for active duty were reservists to be
considered for release.9 7
On November 24, 1990, the Marine Corps mobilized Company
"F", 2d Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, located in Fort Schuyler
(Bronx), New York.93 Lance Corporal Maung M. Lwin, United
States Marine Corps Reserve, who had applied for conscientious
objector status on November 9, refused to report for duty even
though he had allegedly been advised to report notwithstanding
" Marine Corps Order 1306.16E, Conscientious Objectors, para. 6k (Nov. 21 1986).
01 DoDDiR 1300.6, supra note 18, at para. VI(I) (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 75.6(h) (1991))
(emphasis added); see supra notes 43-44.
" 33 M.J. 666 (N.M.C.M.R. 1991)
96 Id. at 667.
17 Id. Members were required to report unless "physically unable to do so." Id.
08 Id.
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his pending conscientious objector application.9"
Lwin was later convicted by special court-martial of the mili-
tary offenses of unauthorized absence and missing movement
through design. °00 Lwin petitioned the Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Military Review for a writ of habeas corpus. 1' 1 The court denied
the writ for two reasons. First, the court found that the Secretary
of Defense's mobilization guidance requiring reservists to report
for duty before submitting applications for release from active
duty was a valid exercise of the Secretary's authority which would
supersede any inconsistent requirements in the Marine Corps regu-
lation. 02 Secondly, the court seized on the word "normally" in the
Marine Corps regulation and concluded that "Marine Corps per-
sonnel procedures were not operating 'normally' when the armed
forces were in the midst of a large scale mobilization.' 10 3
By implicitly holding that the term "normally" did not refer
to the applicant's circumstances, but rather the service's, the court
reached an outcome in accord with the original intent of the provi-
sion. This intent could only have been to avoid burdening the Reg-
ular Marine Corps establishment with processing conscientious ob-
jector applications from reservists involuntarily activated for
unsatisfactory drill participation in peacetime. 04
During the Persian Gulf War, the Army reinstituted an ad-
ministrative measure originally devised to regulate conscientious
objector applications during the Vietnam era. On October 19, 1990,
the Army published a message change to its conscientious objector
regulation that temporarily precluded soldiers who had received
notices of reassignment from submitting conscientious objector ap-
plications until they deployed with their units. 05 The term "reas-
signment" was defined to include a unit deployment. 0 In Pruner
v. Department of the Army," 7 a soldier in the 1st Infantry Divi-
sion at Fort Riley, Kansas, sought a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Army's
9' Id. at 668.
100 Id. at 667; see 10 U.S.C. §§ 886-87 (1988).
101 Lwin, 33 M.J. at 666.
102 Id. at 668.
103 Id.
'o' See 10 U.S.C. § 673a (1988).
10 See U.S. Army, Personnel Message, Oct. 19, 1990, HQDA. The Army subsequently
rescinded the change on January 2, 1991. See U.S. Army, Personnel Message, Jan. 2, 1991.
106 Id.
107 755 F. Supp. 362 (D. Kan.), aff'd, 946 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1991).
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changed procedure. 08 Unable to find irreparable harm, the district
court denied relief. 09 The court pointed out that the plaintiff sol-
dier still had the right to have his application considered while he
was deployed in Saudi Arabia and was entitled to a duty assign-
ment providing minimum practicable conflict with his asserted be-
liefs.110 The court also rejected the oft-raised argument that the
applicant would be irreparably harmed because he would be de-
nied access to counsel if deployed to the Arabian peninsula. While
recognizing that geographic dislocation makes attorney-client com-
munication less convenient, the court found no deprivation of the
right to counsel."'
Although not referred to in Pruner, a district court faced the
same situation twenty-one years earlier in United States ex rel
Crane v. Laird.12 In Crane, a Vietnam-bound soldier challenged a
1970 Army regulation change, made by telegram, that effectively
terminated the practice of allowing Vietnam-bound soldiers to
await final action on their conscientious objector applications in
the continental United States."' The 1970 Army regulation was
virtually identical to the one at issue in Pruner. The Crane court
denied the soldier relief, indicating that the court should presume
that the change was a "reasonable and fair way to deal with the
Army's recurring problem of conscientious objections surfacing for
the first time at the port of embarkation.""-4 The court also fol-
lowed Kimball v. Commandant Twelfth Naval District,"5 that es-
tablished the still valid rule that the federal judiciary will require
only that a claim of conscientious objection be processed without
creating any geographical restrictions on military personnel
assignments. 1 6
In sum, both the Marine Corps and the Army entered the Per-
sian Gulf War with conscientious objector regulations that may
have created expectations that merely filing a conscientious objec-
tor application would prevent mobilization or overseas deployment
pending the outcome of the application. Both services would be
:08 Id. at 363.
09 Id. at 365.
110 Id.
"I Id.
112 315 F. Supp. 837 (D. Ore. 1970).
-1 Id. at 839.
"' Id. at 840.
"' 423 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1970).
", Id. at 91.
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well-advised to consider specifically incorporating the principles of
Kimball and the Department of Defense directive on conscientious
objectors into their regulations. Such changes would make it clear
that merely filing a conscientious objector application will not pre-
vent mobilization, reassignment, or overseas deployment of the
applicant.
V. CONCLUSION
In looking back on conscientious objection in the Gulf War,
three points are worthy of comment. First, the rigorous criteria for
conscientious objection serves as a reminder that this exemption
from military service is an accommodation of religion- and noth-
ing more. Although the scope of the religious belief required has
been expanded to embrace moral or ethical beliefs, our nation's
conscientious objection policy has always been designed to accom-
modate only those "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms." It is
not feasible to accommodate any other class of objector.
Second, the results from the Gulf War vindicate both the all-
volunteer armed forces and their conscientious objection policy.
Even though the ranks of the armed forces were augmented by
thousands of reservists, the war produced only about 350 addi-
tional applications for conscientious objector status from both the
regular and reserve components of the armed forces. Standing
alone, this fact substantially refutes any implication that the ranks
of the armed forces were filled with soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
Marines who had been fraudulently induced to enter the service
through promises of training and benefits or promises that they
would never have to fight. On the contrary, the men and women of
the all-volunteer armed forces were ready, willing, and, in many
cases, eager to fight in the Gulf War.
For their part, the armed forces kept their doors open to con-
scientious objector applications, even though they had no guaran-
tees that the war would be conducted swiftly, produce minimal
casualties, or enjoy widespread popular support. One might have
expected the rate of disapproval of conscientious objector applica-
tions to have soared because of a tougher stance by the armed
forces and more insincere applications; but this did not happen ei-
ther. The application approval rate only declined from approxi-
mately sixty-five percent to about fifty-seven percent. This fact, in
turn, suggests that the armed forces have managed a fair accom-
modation between the overriding demands of duty and discipline,
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on the one hand, and conscientious objection to war, on the other.
Finally, as long as the armed forces are willing to discharge
servicemembers on the basis of conscientious objection-including
those whose beliefs crystallize on the eve of battle-the policy will
be a lightning rod for controversy. This is true because those who
object to our nation's war aims, war strategy, the ethnic line-up of
a particular war, separation from their families or work, or who
simply have no stomach for fighting, normally have no other way
out. How often have we seen a young servicemember suddenly ap-
pear on television and tell us with apparent conviction that he is
not going to fight for "big oil" or "U.S. imperialism," and that, by
the way, he is a "conscientious objector?" Of course, he is no more
a conscientious objector than the general who violently disagrees
with the war aims decided upon by the National Command Au-
thorities.1 7 Few would think that mere disagreement with war
aims should be the basis for exemption from military service.
Superficially at least, this problem of stretching the concept of
conscientious objection could be cured if military authorities would
abandon the overbreadth of the term "conscientious objection"
and authorize an exemption or discharge from military service only
for "religious beliefs." However, so long as our nation is obligated
to resort to the force of arms, war protesters in the service will
continue to claim they are conscientious objectors, and the armed
forces will be called upon to carefully sort out their claims.
117 The National Command Authorities are the President and the Secretary Of De-
fense. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND AsSOCIATED TERMS (JOINT PuB
1-02) 243 (1989).
1992]

